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Convincing participants to deceive remains one of the biggest and most important
challenges of laboratory-based deception research. The simplest and most prevalent
method involves explicitly instructing participants to lie or tell the truth before presenting
each task item. The usual finding of such experiments is increased cognitive load
associated with deceptive responses, explained by necessity to inhibit default and
automatic honest responses. However, explicit instructions are usually coupled with
the absence of social context in the experimental task. Context plays a key role in
social cognition by activating prior knowledge, which facilitates behaviors consistent with
the latter. We hypothesized that in the presence of social context, both honest and
deceptive responses can be produced on the basis of prior knowledge, without reliance
on truth and without additional cognitive load during deceptive responses. In order to
test the hypothesis, we have developed Speed-Dating Task (SDT), which is based on
a real-life social event. In SDT, participants respond both honestly and deceptively to
questions in order to appear similar to each of the dates. The dates are predictable
and represent well-known categories (i.e., atheist or conservative). In one condition
participants rely on explicit instructions preceding each question (external cue). In the
second condition no explicit instructions are present, so the participants need to adapt
based on prior knowledge about the category the dates belong to (internal cue). With
internal cues, reaction times (RTs) are similar for both honest and deceptive responses.
However, in the presence of external cues (EC), RTs are longer for deceptive than
honest responses, suggesting that deceptive responses are associated with increased
cognitive load. Compared to internal cues, deception costs were higher when EC were
present. However, the effect was limited to the first part of the experiment, only partially
confirming our initial hypothesis. The results suggest that the presence of social context
in deception tasks might have a significant influence on cognitive processes associated
with deception.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most difficult aspects of scientific research on
deception is the ecological validity of tasks used in the
experiments. Apart from a few studies using paradigms with
excellent ecological validity (Baumgartner et al., 2009; Greene and
Paxton, 2009; Sip et al., 2010, 2012; Abe and Greene, 2014), a
large chunk of contemporary research on cognitive and neural
correlates of deception is based on Differentiation-of-Deception
(DOD) Paradigm (Furedy et al., 1988) and it’s variant known as
Sheffield Lie Test—SLT (Spence et al., 2001). SLT consists of a set
of questions, usually related to the episodic (“were you inChina for
your last holiday?”) and semantic (“Is Paris the capital of Italy?”)
memory of the participant. Every question is preceded with a cue,
which indicates what type of response is expected for the following
question. The same question is usually repeated twice, one with
“truth” and the other with a “lie” cue. Therefore, each question
provides within-subject control for itself, eliminating the effect of
possible confounders on measures such as reaction times (RTs),
skin conductance and brain activity.
Despite serious doubts about the face validity of instructed
deception paradigms (Sip et al., 2008; Kanwisher, 2009), its
variants have been and still are widely used in behavioral and
neuroimaging studies on deception (Sheridan and Flowers, 2010;
Kaylor-Hughes et al., 2011; Verschuere et al., 2011, 2012; Debey
et al., 2012; Ito et al., 2012; Marchewka et al., 2012; Jiang et al.,
2013; Vartanian et al., 2013). The results of these studies are largely
consistent, most often reporting longer RTs for “lie” compared
to “truth” trials and increased brain activity in regions related
to cognitive control, indicating that additional cognitive load
is associated with deception compared to truth-telling (Christ
et al., 2009; Abe, 2011; Gamer, 2014; Lisofsky et al., 2014).
However, it still remains unknown how reliable these processes
are across different deception contexts (Farah et al., 2014). Given
the complexity and variety of forms in which deception occurs
in real life, one might suspect that cognitive processes associated
with instructed lying cannot be generalized to deception per
se, but instead are specific to the context in which they are
produced. Therefore, further studies are needed to address this
issue. In this paper we propose a new experimental method
of studying deception, which allows to incorporate elements of
social context into a low-stakes deception context. We argue that
the presence of explicit cues might increase the cognitive load
associated with deceptive (compared to honest) responding when
social context is present. In order to present our argument, we
must first consider the role of prior social knowledge in social
interactions.
Humans accumulate knowledge through detection of
regularities in events they experience through life. At any point
in time, prior knowledge is used to guide behavior, make
predictions, and facilitate the acquisition of new knowledge.
Experiments have shown that activation of prior knowledge
facilitates remembering words or facts congruent with that
knowledge (Meyer and Schvaneveldt, 1971; Stangor and
McMillan, 1992; Brod et al., 2013). If prior knowledge has
been activated, it is difficult to consciously avoid utilizing
it (Marsh et al., 1999). The same principles apply to social
interactions. During social interactions prior knowledge related
to similar situations and their participants is used to fulfill
expectations, behave appropriately, or initiate actions with the
intention to achieve a particular goal. Prior knowledge can
take many forms, including stereotypes or schemas. These
forms can be activated by simple cues like skin color (Macrae
and Bodenhausen, 2000), a prime associated with a schema
(Wittenbrink et al., 1997), or an explicit verbal label (Devine,
1989). In most cases the knowledge activation is automatic
and might be unconscious (Allport, 1954; Devine, 1989; Bargh
et al., 1996; Hilton and Von Hippel, 1996; Macrae et al., 1997;
Wyer, 2013). It has been demonstrated that black people are
more likely than whites to get shot in a Police Officer’s Dilemma
task (Correll et al., 2002, 2006), most likely due to activation
of a stereotype of an aggressive black person. A less extreme
example of the influence of stereotype activation comes from
a study where participants with activated rudeness stereotype
were more likely to interrupt the experimenter (Bargh et al.,
1996). Although stereotyping and categorization have negative
connotations and in most cases have been studied as such,
it allows reduction of uncertainty about the environment
(Hogg, 2000). Taken together, these studies demonstrate
that behaviors congruent with activated prior knowledge are
facilitated.
Experimental deception tasks usually do not provide any
familiar social context for the subjects. Thus, no prior knowledge
can be activated and subjects cannot predict what they will be
asked about and what the purpose of these questions is. The
decisions to respond honestly or deceptively are based solely on
cues preceding each question. Since no prior expectations are
active in working memory, the only way deceptive responses
can be emitted is by negation of truth. Negation produces
additional cognitive load as repeatedly reported in instructed
lying paradigms, consistent with theories claiming that deception
is usually more cognitively demanding than truth-telling (Spence
et al., 2001; Walczyk et al., 2005, 2009; Vrij et al., 2008;
Sheridan and Flowers, 2010; Verschuere et al., 2010, 2011;
Kaylor-Hughes et al., 2011; Debey et al., 2012; Marchewka
et al., 2012). This particular process of generating deceptive
responses is accurately described byADCMmodel (Walczyk et al.,
2005).
We argue that if the subjects were able to use prior social
knowledge in the experimental situation, behaviors consistent
with the prior knowledge would be facilitated regardless of
what type of behavior they represent, honest or deceptive.
This is because activation of a stereotype or schema facilitates
the processing of schema-consistent information, thus reducing
associated cognitive load (Macrae et al., 1994; Macrae and
Bodenhausen, 2000). On the other hand, the introduction of
external cues (EC) and the reliance of subjects on these cues leads
to higher cognitive costs of responding deceptively compared to
responding honestly because of the necessity to negate truth. We
hypothesize that the cognitive costs of deception in predictable
social interaction are larger when participants rely on explicit, EC
(lie/truth before each question) compared to the same responses
in the same context based on activated prior knowledge (without
EC). In order to test this hypothesis, we have developed a new
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experimental task which introduces social context to responses to
questions.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Task
For the purpose of studying deception in the context of social
interactions, we have developed the Speed-Dating Task (SDT).
SDT is based on a real social event in which participants engage
in short conversations, after which they decide if they wanted to
meet their speed-date for a real date. After the event is completed
and there is a match between participants, the organizer shares
phone numbers to the matched pair.
SDT is a variation of SLT, which introduces social context
when responding to questions. SDT takes advantage of the general
tendency to think about others in terms of categories (Macrae
and Bodenhausen, 2000), which in most cases allows for accurate
adjustment of behavior.
The questions in SDT are grouped into topics. In the current
version of SDT, available topics include religion and “personal
philosophy of life” (Weltanschauung). A date in SDT refers to
a set of questions referring to the same topic, asked in blocks.
The change of the date is indicated by an appropriate message
on the screen. After each response, feedback is presented on the
screen as a smiley or frownie. Smiley indicates that the subject’s
response is consistent with the current date’s attitude, while the
frownie indicates inconsistency. Each date has a fixed set of
response-dependent feedback messages that are contingent with
the stereotypical attitude toward the discussed topic. Questions
related to each topic are asked by two dates, which represent
opposite attitudes (e.g., for religion—atheist and deeply believing
catholic). If the subject responded in the same way to the same
question when interacting with both dates, he/she would receive
positive feedback one time and negative the other time. However,
if the subject adapts responses to the attitude of each date, one
deceptive and one honest response will be produced. This feature
of SDT guarantees that regardless of the true attitude of the subject
both honest and dishonest responses will be emitted, assuming
that the subject will be asked to adapt his/her responses to each
date. Moreover, just as in SLT, each question will provide within-
subject control for itself without the need for any explicit cue
before each question. However, the above feature is conditional
on the presence of clear subject’s attitude toward the matter the
question is referring to.
The questions related to each stereotype (atheist, catholic,
liberal, conservative) were selected on the basis of a separate web-
based questionnaire study. In the questionnaire, the participants
were instructed that their goal will be to fill the remaining
responses in a questionnaire for another person who managed
to fill in only the first four questions. The questions filled
by another person are called “diagnostic questions” because
they strongly suggested a particular stereotype. There were two
response options for each question: yes and no. It was assumed
that if a stereotype is activated consistently, the responses to
questions will be consistent between participants. The same set
of questions was asked twice, preceded with opposite responses
to the same diagnostic questions. Two criteria were used for
inclusion of the questions in the main task: (1) consistency
of predictions between participants and (2) high probability of
opposite responses given the activation of different stereotypes.
This procedure guaranteed that the same set of questions followed
by opposite feedbacks would lead to activation of opposite
stereotypes.
Example dates are presented in Figure 1. A maximum of 20
questions could be asked for each date. Since the subjects engaged
in four dates in this version of SDT, a total maximum of 80
questions were asked during the procedure.
Participants
Thirty-nine persons participated in the study (20 males). They
were pseudo-randomly divided into two groups depending on
whether their responses were affected by internal cues (IC) or EC.
The randomization ensured that the number of males was equal
in both IC and EC groups. The subjects were recruited through
a Facebook group related to cognitive neuroscience. Participants
received financial compensation for participation (100 zł, 25
Euro).
Procedure
The present study was designed as an fMRI experiment. However,
the fMRIdata is still being analyzed and the resultswill be reported
elsewhere upon completion. Here we report only behavioral data
acquired during the fMRI session.
Before the experiment subjects filled out a written consent for
participation in the study and a safety questionnaire for MRI.
The study was approved by the University of Social Sciences and
Humanities ethics committee. Before the experiment the subjects
filled out an online survey where they responded honestly to
statements reflecting the questions later asked during SDT. Three
response options were available: agree, disagree, and don’t know.
Based on these responses, questions with a “don’t know” answer
were removed from the task in both IC and EC groups. Response
cues were generated if the subject was assigned to the EC group.
The experiment was performed in a 3T Siemens Trio MRI
scanner with 32-channel phased-array head coil. The imaging
protocol consisted of localizer, 10-min resting-state recording,
SDT and structural imaging. The SDT was performed for
approximately 19 min. However, the exact duration varied
depending on the response pace of the participant. The subjects
viewed the stimuli on a 29” LCD monitor standing in the back of
the scanner. The LCDwas seen through amirror systemmounted
on the coil. The subjects responded with two NeuroNordicLab
ResponseGrips held in both hands. The responses weremadewith
thumbs. The right thumb corresponded to a YES answer and the
left to NO. The cue presenting the side which corresponds to a
particular response was always presented with the question, on
the bottom part of the screen. Stimulus delivery and behavioral
response recording was controlled by Presentation® software
(version 17.2).
Experimental Manipulations
The core manipulation of the study was achieved by randomized
group assignment of the subjects. The first group, called internally
cued (IC), was instructed that the goal of the SDT is to convince
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FIGURE 1 | Speed-Dating Task. Two representative questions and feedback messages for two different dates. The subject participating in the SDT is an atheist,
not participating in any kind of religion. Person 01 is also an atheist with identical attitudes, so every honest response results in positive feedback. However, Person
03 is a faithful catholic, so the feedback following honest responses (questions 1 and 2) is negative, indicating inconsistency. Based on the feedbacks the subject can
adjust his responses so that he appears similar to the date (questions 3 and 4). The questions are presented serially.
all dates to a real date. The best way to achieve this goal is to adapt
the responses to give the impression of similarity. Thus, the IC
group had to infer the attitude of each date based on feedbacks
and respond on the basis of the activated stereotype. Each question
was preceded with an “A” cue, reminding subjects to adapt. The
instruction for this group was as follows (direct translation from
Polish):
You are participating in a study about adaptation in social
interactions. During the task you will engage in so-called
speed-dates with four different persons. The goal of speed-
dating is to convince the other person to a real date. Your
goal will be to convince all your dates to have a real date
with you. Each date will ask questions related to various
topics. Youwill answerYES (right button) orNO (left button).
Soon after your response, feedback will be displayed on the
screen indicating whether your response was consistent with
the current date’s attitude. A smiley will indicate consistency,
a frownie—inconsistency. Your job will be to create the
impression that you have an identical attitude towards
the discussed topic for each date. The letter “A” will be
displayed before each question, reminding you to adapt
your responses. Please respond as fast as possible—the time
to respond is limited.
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The second, externally cued (EC) group obtained additional
instruction that they will receive aid by having an appropriate cue
displayed on the screen before and during the question. Cueing
was achieved by replacing the bolded sentence in instruction for
the IC group with:
We will help you with that task. Before each question you
will see a cue in form of a letter “T”(in green) or “L” (in
red). A green letter “T” indicates that an honest response for
the following question will be consistent with current date’s
attitude. The letter “L” indicates that a deceptive response will
be consistent with the date’s attitude. Do your best to follow
these cues.
If the honest response was consistent with the date’s attitude,
“T” cue appeared and both the cue and question were presented
in green. When a deceptive response was appropriate, a “L” cue
was presented in red, followed by a red-colored question. The
color cue was introduced to ensure that participants remembered
the presented cue and did not have to store cue information
in working memory. Importantly, if the subject followed the
presented cues, all responses were consistent with the date’s
attitude. Note that despite introducing explicit instructions, the
experimental task did not prevent the EC group from responding
based on activated stereotype while ignoring the presented cues.
Data Analysis
In order to the test the hypotheses of the experiment, linear mixed
models (LMM) were used for data analysis. The main advantages
of LMMs include explicit modeling of subject- and item-specific
random effects, thus increasing statistical power over models
averaging the data on the first level of analysis (Baayen et al., 2008).
The RTs are approximately log-normally distributed (Rouder,
2005). Therefore, the dependent variable in the model is the log
reaction time (log RT). The reported differences in RT will be
reported as percentage change.
The LMM included random intercepts for both subjects and
items. These allowed us to control for unmeasured individual
differences between subjects (reading speed, IQ, workingmemory
capacity etc.), as well as differences between SDT items, including
question length. Random slopes for within-subject main effects
and interactions were also included in the model. This allowed
to further account for individual differences in effects of interest
(Kliegl et al., 2010; Jaeger et al., 2011).
Three factors and their interactions were entered as
fixed effects. The within-subject factors included response
(honest/adaptive) and question repetition (first/second).
The between-subject factor was cue type (external/internal).
Interactions of all fixed effects were also included in the
fixed-effects part of the statistical model.
In order to test the main hypothesis of the experiment,
a contrast analysis was performed on parameter estimates of
the statistical model. The main hypothesis of the experiment
corresponded to the contrast:
The errors in the SDT are defined as failures to adapt to the
current date. These errors were calculated separately for both
honest and deceptive responses.
TABLE 1 | Misses and false alarms committed by both groups in the early
(questions 1–3) and late (questions 4+) stages of dates.
Group
Error type Date stage EC IC Total
False alarm early (Q 1–3) 45% (9) 55% (11) 20
late (Q 4+) 81,8% (18) 18,2% (4) 22
Miss early (Q 1–3) 19,1% (9) 80,9% (38) 47
late (Q 4+) 53,1% (26) 46,9% (23) 49
All data analysis was performed in R 3.1.2 (R Core Team,
2015) with auxiliary packages. Parameters of Gaussian-
exponential distribution were fit with the retimes (Massidda,
2013) package. For LMMs, lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) was used.
The lmerTest (Kuznetsova et al., 2014) package was used
for p-value approximation for LMMs, and the multcomp
package was used for planned contrasts (Hothorn et al.,
2008). The default single-step multiple comparisons correction
method implemented in multcomp was used for all exploratory
analyses.
RESULTS
Errors
Since the number of trials varied between subjects, error
rates instead of counts are formally compared. Two types of
errors were possible. The first type is related to a deceptive
response while an honest one is consistent with the date’s
attitude—a false alarm. Errors are presented in Table 1. The
total number of false alarm errors committed by both groups
was 42 (1.8% of all responses). The IC group made slightly
fewer false alarms compared to the EC group [2.6% (min/max:
0–8.1%) vs 3.9% (min/max: 0–18.9%), respectively]. However,
this difference was not significant according to Welch 2-sample
t-test [t(32.84) = 1.02, p = 0.31]. Nearly half of all false alarms
(47.6%–20 of 42) were committed during responding to first 3
questions (11 vs 9 for IC and EC groups, respectively). Within the
remaining 52.4% (22) false alarms, the majority was committed
by the EC group (81.8%–18). It must be noted that during
the whole task 25 of 39 subjects have committed no errors, 10
subjects–1 error, 3 subjects–2 errors and the remaining subject has
committed 6 false alarm errors.
The second type reflects the opposite—an honest response
instead of deceptive—a miss. The total number of misses for
both groups was 96 (4.1% of all responses). The IC group made
more misses type errors compared to the EC group [11.1%
(2.6–27.3%) vs 5.32% (0–12%)] and the difference was significant
[t(26.93) = 3.05, p = 0.005]. Approximately half (48.9%  47 of
96) of these errors were committed when responding to first 3
questions asked by dates, with most mistakes made by the IC
group (80.9%–38). For the remaining 51.1% (49) questions the
number of errors was roughly equal [46.9% (23) and 53.1% (26)
for IC and EC groups, respectively].
For a total of 18 items it was not possible to determine the type
of response (honest or deceptive). Thus, from the original sample
of 2348 RTs, 156 were removed from further analyses (6.6%).
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Reaction Times
Raw Data
After exclusion of questions for which the participants had no
opinion, the subjects responded on average to 56 questions
[SD= 11, range= (31–77)]. Therefore 14 responses per condition
were analyzed on average for each subject. Although the number
of questions was slightly higher in the EC (57.6) compared to
IC group (54.7), the difference was not significant [Welch’s t-
test: difference 95% CI: ( 10.2–4.5), t(30.92) =  0.79, p = 0.43,
Cohen’s d = 0.28].
The histograms of raw data for each condition in the task
are presented in Figure 2. For the first presentation of the
question, the IC group had higher expected RTs for honest
(m +  = 2287 ms, s = 396 ms) than deceptive responses
(m +  = 2097 ms, s = 499 ms). In the EC group, RTs for
both conditions were similar (m +  = 2509 ms, s = 515 ms
for honest and m +  = 2543 ms, s = 547 ms for deceptive
responses). For the second repetition of the same question, the
relationship in IC group was reversed with m +  = 1913 ms,
s = 297 ms for honest and m +  = 2158 ms, s = 313 ms
for deceptive responses. In the EC group honest responses were
faster (m +  = 2295 ms, s = 430 ms) than deceptive responses
(m+  = 2475 ms, s = 489 ms).
The expected RTs in the EC group are longer in all conditions.
Moreover, the distributions of RTs in the EC group seem to be
more dispersed (higher s values) and have heavier right tails
(higher  values) compared to the IC group.
The above data suggest some differences between honest
and deceptive responses, which is inconsistent with the main
hypothesis of this experiment. However, one must consider a very
important aspect of the experiment which has profound influence
on the measured RTs—the length of presented questions.
The length of questions in SDT varied between 27 and 77
characters (including spaces). Assuming average reading speed
of 24 ms per letter, due to differences in question length alone
50  24 ms = 1200 ms RT difference is expected between the
shortest and longest questions. The average question length was
not balanced between conditions. This is a side-effect of the
structure of SDT. For the first repetition, the length of questions
with honest responses was approximately 7 characters longer than
deceptive responses in both IC and EC groups. This difference
corresponds to 7  24 ms = 168 ms expected RT difference
between conditions. For the second repetition of questions, the
same difference held, but in the opposite direction—questions
with deceptive responses had more characters. These question-
specific differences, as well as between-subject differences
resulting from a varying number of trials per subject, were taken
into account by random effect components of the statistical
model.
Confirmatory Analyses
The total R2 value for the fittedmodel was 0.606, with 0.048 for the
fixed effects. The distribution of residuals of the model deviated
from normal even after log-transformation of the dependent
variable, but this behavior was expected. Plotting residual vs
predicted values did not show any significant relationship
(Pearson’s  = 0.05).
The coefficients along with standard errors and confidence
intervals are presented in Table 2. The expected values and
confidence intervals based on the fitted model are presented for
all conditions in Figure 3.
We have found no significant RT differences between deceptive
and honest responses in both IC [1.5%, 95% CI: ( 2.8–5.77%),
p= 0.68] and EC groups [2.6%, 95%CI: ( 1.49–6.78%), p= 0.28].
Contrast analysis showed that in EC group the difference between
deceptive and honest responses in terms of RTs was 1.15% [95%
CI: ( 3.8–6.1%)] larger compared to IC group. This result could
not be interpreted as significantly different from 0 (z = 0.45,
p = 0.65). Therefore, we did not find statistical support for our
primary hypothesis.
Exploratory Analyses
Figure 2 indicates that the hypothesized effect might be present
only for the first repetition of questions. Thus, we performed
an additional contrast analysis testing the main hypothesis only
for the first repetition of the question. For the first repetition of
the questions, IC group showed no significant difference between
deceptive and honest responses [2.7%, 95% CI: ( 3.4–8.8%),
p = 0.7]. RTs in EC group were 9.27% [95% CI: (3.4–15.14%),
p = 0.0003] higher for deceptive compared to honest responses.
The difference between deceptive and honest responses was
greater in the externally cued group compared to the internally
cued group by 6.56% [95% CI: (0.5–12.6%)], and this difference
may be considered as significant (z = 2.12, p = 0.03). This result
provides a partial confirmation of our primary hypothesis. No
significant difference between deceptive and honest responses was
found for the second repetition of questions in both groups: 0.2%,
95% CI: ( 6–6.55%) p = 1 and  3.98%, 95% CI: ( 10–2.1%),
p= 0.35 for IC and EC groups, respectively.
Moreover, Figures 2 and 3 also suggests that the externally
cued group was generally slower than the internally cued group,
consistent with raw data analysis. However, contrast analysis
showed that it is not the case. The EC group had 7.6% [95%
CI: ( 3.8–19%)] longer RTs compared to the IC group, and
this difference could not be considered as significant (z = 1.3,
p= 0.19).
DISCUSSION
In the current paper we hypothesized that the introduction of
EC to deception and truth-telling alters the decision-making
process, so that it is most likely that deceptive responding will be
associated with higher cognitive load compared to truth telling.
We argued that the main reason for this effect is the absence of
social context in the decision-making process; schemas activated
by social context facilitate responses consistent with it.
In order to test this hypothesis we developed the SDT, which
is based on a classic DOD/SLT paradigm, but introduces social
context when responding to questions. Most importantly the
social context is highly predictable for the participants, which is
reflected by relatively low error rates regardless of the type of cue
that was presented.
We found partial support for our primary hypothesis. The RT
difference between deceptive and honest responses was higher in
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FIGURE 2 | The histograms represent raw RTs for each group, repetition and response type. Mu, sigma, and tau values represent parameters of the
Gaussian-exponential distribution fit to the raw data (blue line). E(RT) denotes expected value of raw data (mu + tau), and the value in the parentheses represents the
expected value based on fixed effects of the statistical model (red vertical line). P(RESP|REP,GRP) denotes the probability of the response presented in each
histogram given the repetition and group it belongs to. QL denotes mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) of average question length (number of characters) for the
respective conditions.
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TABLE 2 | Linear mixed model coefficients (non-standardized), standard errors (SE), degrees of freedom (df), t-statistic value of a test comparing the
parameter estimate to null distribution (t) and the p-value testing significance of the difference from 0 (p).
Term Estimate SE df t p
Intercept 7.675 0.05 62.34 152.025  0
RESP : Deceptive 0.027 0.025 40.06 1.105 0.276
REP : Second  0.072 0.032 51.84  2.231 0.03
CUE : External 0.076 0.058 36.75 1.302 0.201
RESP: Deceptive  REP: Second  0.024 0.032 39.16  0.767 0.448
RESP: Deceptive  CUE: External 0.066 0.031 36.05 2.118 0.041
REP: Second  CUE: External 0.086 0.038 36.52 2.252 0.03
RESP: Deceptive  REP: Second  CUE: External  0.108 0.039 32.18  2.757 0.01
The Intercept term represents expected log RT for honest responses to first repetition of questions in the IC group.
FIGURE 3 | Least-squares estimates of expected RT values with 95% confidence intervals for all conditions.
the externally cued group compared to the internally cued group.
This effect was present only for the first presentation of questions
and not for the second.
We speculate that the main reason why the effect was found
only for the first presentation of the question stems from the
presence of a predictable social situation in both the internally
and externally cued groups. Although the EC group received cues
about what type of response was expected, they were not forced to
rely on them in the decision-making process. Instead, the subjects
could ignore the EC and base their responses on the schemata
activated by feedbacks, in the same way as in the IC group. Thus,
subjects could transition to the same decision-making process as
the IC group and there was no control over this process. However,
this result remains largely speculative. No RT differences were
found for the second repetition of the questions, suggesting a
change in the decision-making process. The transition of the
strategy in the EC group after interactions with the first two
dates can be explained by accumulation of task-related knowledge.
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The subjects realized that the interlocutors are stereotypical and
responses consistent with their attitudes are easily predictable,
thus reducing cognitive load related to responding deceptively.
This effect is consistent with CL2 proposition of Information
Manipulation Theory 2 (IMT2)—“the projected cognitive load
of potential problem solutions should determine whether one
pursues a discourse path that ends up being truthful or deceptive”
(McCornack et al., 2014). In the case of SDT with both a
predictable social situation and EC, the subjects tend to choose
a less cognitively demanding decision-making process (schema-
based) over a more demanding one (cue-based).
The results from error analysis are consistent with the claim
that external cuingmight be associatedwith higher cognitive load.
Although the IC group committed themajority ofmiss-type errors
(honest response when deceptive was consistent with the date’s
attitude), half of these errors were committed when responding
to first 3 questions asked by dates. Since the IC group had
no knowledge about the interlocutors, they responded honestly.
Only after observing negative feedbacks after these responses
they could activate appropriate schemata and respond in line
with it. On the other hand, EC group had the cues presented
from the beginning and could rely on them. For the remaining
questions the number of miss errors was similar for both groups.
For false alarms (deceptive responses instead of honest), there is
no evidence for between-group difference for first 3 questions,
but for the remaining questions the majority of false alarms was
committed by EC group.
Given the task structure, one must consider that the errors
for both groups might emerge from different processes. In the
EC group, both types of errors can be understood as failures
to comply with the instruction. This is common for instructed-
lying paradigms and can be attributed to failure of cognitive
control. On the other hand, errors in the IC group are likely to
emerge from lack of precise knowledge about the interlocutor (or
the relationship between response to a particular question and
date’s attitude) and could be interpreted as failures of theory of
mind. However, these interpretations are speculative and further
research is needed to examine the nature of errors in different
contexts. The total number of errors in the present study is too
small (6% of all responses) to allow for detailed analyses.
DOD/SLT paradigms provide no social context or purpose to
responses emitted by subjects. Thus, no information can enter
the working memory before questions are asked. In order to
deceive, one indeed has to retrieve the honest information first
and then deny it, which requires additional cognitive resources.
This process might reflect only a sample from all possible
contexts in which deceptive responses might emerge. Although
this model seems to apply to high-stakes forensic context, it
seems inaccurate with respect to the most frequent low-stakes
everyday life deception (Serota et al., 2010). People tend to stay
in predictable and stable environments and very rarely engage in
unpredictable social interactions. The context provides cues that
might facilitate specific kinds of behaviors, including deceptive
ones. This increases the availability of deceptive variants of
behavior, reducing the cognitive resources necessary to emit
such behaviors. Although truthful information might also be
simultaneously activated in the WM, our study shows that it does
not interfere with deceptive responding. This is consistent with
the claims of IMT2 model (McCornack et al., 2014), which places
no sharp boundary between honest and deceptive responses in
low-stakes situation.
Although the main interest of deception research are high-
stakes lies, we believe that paradigms utilizing low-stakes stakes
lies with social component (such as the SDT) can be useful
in advancing the knowledge about deception in general. SDT
provides a framework of incorporating prior knowledge into the
experimental deception tasks. Although we have used simple and
well-known categories in the current study as a model of prior
knowledge, the same concept could be generalized to other social
contexts, in which one person tries to create a specific impression
on another. The knowledge incorporated into the tasks can be
controlled ormeasured by the experimenter. At the same time, the
most important feature of DOD/SLT paradigms (items providing
control for themselves) is maintained.
Prior knowledge might also play an important role in high-
stakes situations. Activation of prior knowledge by any kind of
social cues can facilitate deceptive responding, even in high-
stakes situations (Walczyk et al., 2014). Social features might also
interfere with honest responding, producing higher cognitive load
associated with some honest responses (Littlefield et al., 2015).
Therefore, we believe that incorporation and modeling of prior
knowledge into experimental deception tasks will allow to further
understand the complexity of deception.
Study Limitations
The current study has important implications; however,
limitations also need to be considered. First, the study is severely
underpowered. The study had a very limited number of trials per
participant and relatively small number of participants per group.
Second, the experimental manipulations employed in the study
were imperfect. The subjects in the EC group could use both
schemata and cue-based decision-making process, which might
be the primary reason why the effects were relatively weak and
present only for the first presentation of the question. Third, the
differences between conditions of interest were confounded by
aspects of the items. Although the influence of the confounders
can be controlled at statistical level, ideally they should be
controlled at the level of experimental procedure. The first,
second, and third limitation lead to relatively small effects and
large confidence intervals for studied groups.
SDT also falls short in terms of ecological validity. Although
effort has been put into modeling the processes present in real-
life social interactions (incorporation of prior knowledge and
predictability of social situation), the context of the interactions
is simplified and one cannot conclude that the same principles
would apply to real social interactions. However, we believe that
the introduction of simplified social context is an important
advance in laboratory-based deception studies and should be
pursued further.
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